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Abstract 
 
How are markets developed and governed? The paper reviews four perspectives on the 
formation and development of markets and market governance – the political perspective 
(Fligstein), the network perspective (White), the framing perspective (Callon) and the 
soft law/expert power perspective (Slaughter).  It then utilizes these perspectives in order 
to understand the development of the market for over-the counter derivatives. It finds that 
this market was stabilised and governed through the operation of all of these features – 
power, networks, framing and expert power. The International Swaps and Dealers 
Association  (ISDA) to which all market participants belong has played a central role in 
this process. It has created a Master Agreement that is the common basis to all OTC 
derivative contracts across the world and seeks to overcome potentially problematic areas 
such as netting and collateral. It brings together all market participants and uses their 
expertise witin its committees to develop new rules. However, the paper shows that ISDA 
as a private international association cannot sustain governance by itself. It has to 
influence national governments in order to ensure that its Master Agreement is 
enforceable even though the agreement favours ISDA members above other actors. This 
has the potential for political controversy though mainly governments deal with it as an 
issue of technical expertise. At the public, international level, the central bankers forum 
in Basle are also concerned with the oversight of the sector and have issued a number of 
warnings about potential sources of instability arising form the derivatives market. The 
paper illustrates that the market formation process is highly complex and that the 
governance of the market is multi-levelled and precarious. The research raises questions 
about how other complex markets are being created and how their governance structures 
are determined 
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Introduction 
  
How are markets governed? In recent years, social scientists have been much more 
interested in understanding how markets are constructed and sustained. Contributions 
from the ‘new economic sociology (Dobbin 2004; Fligstein 2001; Guillen et al. 2002) 
and developments arising from actor network theory (such as Callon 1998; MacKenzie 
2006; MacKenzie et al. 2007) have brought a new attention to how markets form and are 
governed. Alongside this, commentators have pointed to the decline of the hierarchical 
control of markets through state regulation and the growing significance of self-
governance through market participants and knowledge experts (Djelic and Sahlin-
Andersson 2006; Slaughter 2004). This paper draws on these debates in order to 
understand how a particular type of market is governed. In particular it emphasizes the 
multi-level and multi-actor nature of governance and the consequences of this for market 
development and market stability. In doing so it contributes to the broader discussion on 
the nature of markets and their governance in the current period. 
 
The object of analysis in the paper is the market for what are termed Over-the-counter 
(hereafter OTC) derivatives. This market is a particularly useful site for examining 
changing processes of market governance for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is a 
relatively new market, growing rapidly over the last decade from small beginnings in the 
1980s. It is therefore still possible to reconstruct what were perceived as barriers to 
creating markets in financial derivatives and to identify how these were overcome and 
with what consequences for different social actors. Secondly, this is a large and growing 
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part of the financial markets. In December 2005, notional amounts of $285 trillion were 
involved in OTC derivatives contracts according the Bank for International Settlements. 
Although this overstates the significance of OTC derivatives in the global economy by 
focusing on the total value of assets in the contracts rather than just the gross market 
values of the derivative contracts themselves ($9 trillion in December 2005), it is 
nevertheless clear that financial derivatives are of growing importance. This is reflected 
in the third point that the market has been increasing rapidly, growing by almost 50% 
between December 2003 and December 2004. Fourthly, this is an international market 
where deals are traded across national boundaries between financial actors and other 
corporate bodies that are themselves often multinational in nature. In this situation, there 
cannot be simply a reliance on a single national legal framework defined by geographical 
location to provide the basis for contracts or remedies for failures. Fifthly this is a highly 
innovative and rapidly changing market. Financial institutions gain competitive edge by 
developing new sorts of derivatives, pricing them in new ways and hedging risk in new 
ways.  
 
How is it possible to create sufficient stability and predictability in these markets that 
actors are willing to engage in such large, complex, innovative and uncertain deals? The 
paper explores these issues in the following ways. Firstly, the paper examines the recent 
interest in the social construction of markets and in particular the way in which financial 
markets have emerged and are constructed. Secondly, the paper provides a brief account 
of the emergence of financial derivatives and the nature of the market for derivatives, 
particularly the distinction between regulated exchanges and the over-the counter (OTC) 
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markets which are the main concern of this paper. It also describes how the research was 
conducted. The third empirical section of the paper consists mainly of a study of the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and its role in constructing a 
governance system for this area of the market both from the perspective of developing 
and communicating a shared understanding and contractual framework to the market and 
in terms of ensuring that this is legally enforceable in different national jurisdictions. The 
fourth section of the paper  focuses briefly on the broader debate concerning the stability 
of the global financial system and the effect of the growth of OTC derivatives on this. In 
particular how have public authorities (states and their central bankers) engaged in 
collective action (through, for example, the Bank for International Settlements amongst 
others) to identify and ameliorate risks emerging from the growth of derivatives where it 
is private actors that mostly set the terms for this market? The concluding section of the 
paper summarises the contribution of this analysis to the emergence of markets in an era 
when technical expertise, private rule making and international dealings make for a more 
multi-level and multi-actor form of governance than was previously the case. 
 
The social construction of markets  
Fligstein and Dauer have recently distinguished three broad approaches to the study of 
markets in the emerging new economic sociology (Fligstein and Dauer forthcoming). The 
first which describes Fligstein’s own work can be labelled as the markets as politics 
approach. The focus here is on how different actors through engagement in politics and 
the exercise of power compete to shape the rules which govern markets (Fligstein 2001; 
Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002). The second approach sees markets as structures of 
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network relationships. In this perspective (e.g.. Burt 1992; Leifer and White 1987), the 
focus is on mapping interactions within the market and identifying segments, structural 
holes and status positions. High status brings rewards and power but the ability to jump 
over structural holes and connect new networks of market participants together is also a 
valuable resource, generating new possibilities. The third more recent perspective is to 
identify markets as mechanisms (even machines) of calculation. This approach has 
developed out of actor network analysis and is now generally known as ‘social studies of 
finance’, echoing the ‘social studies of science’ approaches that developed out of actor 
network theory.  In this approach the focus is on understanding how market objects are 
created through what Callon (1998) identifies as an act of framing. In order to be 
available for selling on the market, an object or service must be bounded and limited; it 
must identify itself with certain characteristics that are transferred over the market and it 
must be freed from any loose or more social or moral obligations that might, in certain 
circumstances, cling to it. The market must then have a set of calculative practices and 
calculative machines which enable prices to be set that are legitimate, predictable and 
sustainable; where there are overflows which do not fit into the frame, actions are taken 
to identify, monitor and control these overflows in order to fit them back into the frame 
(see also Buenza, Hardie and MacKenzie 2006; Callon and Muniesa 2005; MacKenzie 
2006; MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu 2007).  
 
These approaches are highly suggestive and relevant to the study undertaken here. As 
will be shown, ISDA is engaged in a game of power, seeking to bend national legal 
systems to its own purposes. Part of the way it does that is through engaging its members 
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and the experts that support them in a decentralised but connected network that allows 
this game of power to be conducted in different ways depending on the particular context 
concerned.  Finally, a central part of this is to continually construct the frame in which 
derivatives are defined and shaped through its array of committees and amendments to 
the Master Agreement.  
 
These approaches to market formation are complemented by studies from political 
science about the changing nature of regulation in global financial markets and the shift 
away from state direction (government) towards more diffused forms of authority, often 
private and located in industry and professional associations, described broadly as ‘self-
regulation’ and ‘soft law’. In so far as public authority is engaged, it is increasingly seen 
as beyond individual states and increasingly based on cooperation between networks of 
central bankers and concerned mainly with the stability of the global financial system 
rather than issues of detail about how markets are evolving. These changes reflect the 
broader argument that what is emerging is what Slaughter (2004) labels ‘the new world 
order’ where the central importance of epistemic communities and policy networks of 
professionals in particular fields constructing their own modes and modalities of 
governance is the focus (Haas 1992; Keck and Sikkink 1999). The emphasis on ‘soft law’ 
involves the creation of standards by associations, experts and professional bodies to 
which firms voluntarily adhere in order to protect and enhance their legitimacy (see e.g. 
the cases in Djelic and Sahin-Andersson 2006, e.g. Morth 2006; also Brunsson, 
Jacobsson et al. 2000; Abbott and Snidal 2000; Quack 2007). These processes are 
increasingly international in scope working through and in tandem with international 
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institutions such as the EU, the WTO, the Basle accords (on capital adequacy 
requirements for banks) as well as through their own linkages in international firms 
(lawyers, accountants, bankers etc.) and in international professional associations. They 
aim to facilitate and expand markets and subordinate the application of ‘political’ forms 
of regulation to the development of the free market system (see e.g. the cases in Dezalay 
and Garth 2002). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how these changes have been accomplished in 
one particular part of the financial market (that of over-the counter derivatives) and with 
what effects. How has the development of this market been governed? Drawing on the 
theoretical discussions of this section, it will examine; 
• How have political interests and power been involved in the creation of the market? 
• How have network characteristics contributed to the stabilisation of the rules of the 
market? 
• How have derivatives been framed as products by market participants? 
• Do these changes fit the model of decentralised and expert governance?   
 
Financial derivatives 
The basic idea of a derivative is that it ‘derives’ its value from another asset such as 
currencies, bonds and equities. In market situations, the value of these assets is likely to 
move up and down with varying degrees of volatility. The first function of derivatives is 
to protect actors against this volatility – to allow them to transfer this particular risk to 
other actors who are, for whatever reason, more willing to bear it. Derivatives come in 
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four main sorts; forwards, futures, options and swaps. Forwards are contracts in which 
one party undertakes to buy and the other party to sell, a set quantity of an asset of a 
particular type at a set price at a given future time. If the contract is standardized and 
traded on an organized exchange, it is referred to as a Future. An Option is a contract in 
which the purchased gains the right, but is not obliged to buy (call) or to sell (put) an 
asset at a given price (the strike price or exercise price) on, or up to, a given future date 
(the expiration). The seller (or writer) of the option is obliged to fulfil his/her part of the 
contract if so demanded. A swap is a contract to exchange two income streams, for 
example fixed-rate and floating-rate interest on the same notional principal sum.  
 
Derivatives are traded in two sorts of markets. The earliest sort of derivatives markets 
beginning in the 1960s were based on exchanges in particular physical locations such as 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT).Exchanges have fixed ranges of products and fixed units of size, as well as fixed 
length of contracts. These markets were notorious for vigorous ‘open-pit’ trading in 
which traders wearing brightly coloured jackets for identification purposes literally 
rubbed shoulders with their competitors as they noisily bid for business (MacKenzie 
2006; Zaloom 2006). Most exchanges are now becoming electronically based and pit 
trading is in decline.  
 
In addition to these markets, however, exist what are termed the OTC markets that are the 
focus of this paper. Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives now involve much higher sums 
than do traded exchanges. In December 2005, the amount outstanding on all organized 
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exchanges (both futures and options contracts) was around $58 trillion dollars. In OTC 
markets, the sum was $248 trillion – over four and a half times as big. Contrary to the 
organized exchanges, options on the OTC market were initially structured on a one-off 
basis for particular clients. This customising allows the client much more leeway in 
determining exactly how they want to structure their option – including timing and size as 
well as in terms of linking different sorts of derivatives together into synthetic securities 
such as swaps. In the OTC market, deals were struck on a bilateral basis usually over the 
telephone in the first instance. Prices were not transparent but negotiated ad hominen on a 
one-off basis depending on market conditions, the nature of the client, the overall 
exposure of the institution to the particular client and the calculative technology and 
strategic intent of the deal maker. Purchasers contact the main market makers seeking 
prices for the products which they require. In recent years, there has been some effort to 
roll out electronic trading platforms that can increase the transparency of prices and the 
speed of deal-making as well as keep a trace of all deals done and ensure they are 
properly settled (Dodd 2002). However, trading on electronic platforms remains limited 
because of the complexity of the products and the need to tailor them to the specific 
credit worthiness of the client, thus negating the possibility of automated, anonymous 
trading systems (Smith 2005). On the other hand, the lack of a proper electronic ‘paper’ 
trail for derivatives has led to concerns amongst central bankers and the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS 1998; 2007).  
 
How is this market governed? In order to answer this question, research for this paper has 
been undertaken in a variety of ways. In particular, there now exists a large amount of 
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information available in the public domain. Firstly, the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) has an extensive website which reveals a large amount of 
information relevant to the question. Two sorts of information are particularly useful 
from the ISDA. The first consists of its structure, modes of operation and membership. 
This enables the researcher to identify both the key areas of concern for the ISDA and the 
key actors in these processes. The second part of the website concerns the detailed 
discussion of the Master Agreement and questions of its applicability in different national 
contexts. ISDA representatives have also answered specific questions relating to this 
research. Secondly, there is now a substantial amount of analysis and statistics made 
available through the Bank for International Settlements. These date back to the first 
major BIS  report on ‘Macroeconomic and Monetary Policy Issues raised by the Growth 
of Derivatives Markets’ (BIS 1994; generally referred to as the Hannoun report, after its 
chair, Herve Hannoun from the Banque de France). Statistical data is also supplied 
regularly by BIS. The third source consists of reports in the specialist financial press that 
have examined the growth of derivatives products and associated with this the publication 
of various analyses by private financial consultancies and others. The fourth source 
consists of commentaries published by lawyers and law firms associated with derivatives 
markets (especially Flanagan 2001 and Werlen and Flanagan 2002 and statements 
published by the London-based law firm Allen & Overy, one of the high prestige ‘magic 
circle’ law firms associated with the City of London: Allen & Overy has a particularly 
strong relationship with ISDA, including at the current time a shared building). These 
sources provide a rich variety of perspectives and data on how this market has grown.  
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Market Governance in OTC trading 
OTC derivatives are traded internationally. They occur in a variety of currencies and they 
link actors in a variety of national jurisdictions. How is this market governed? What gives 
actors the certainty that they can engage in these complex international, high-value 
transactions without unexpected losses? What gives them the confidence that the 
obligations and rights arising from contracts are common across firms and across national 
boundaries?  
 
The key to creating this governance system has been the development of a private 
industry based association (known as ISDA). According to Flanagan (2001) ISDA 
emerged from discussions in New York in the early 1980s led by Salomon Brothers bank. 
Salomons brought together 10 other institutions that were beginning to sell OTC 
derivatives (particularly swaps) on a regular basis. Salomons were concerned about the 
uncertainties regarding contracts and documentation standards that existed. This group 
then employed the high status US law firm of Cravaths to advise them on how to proceed 
(Allen & Overy from London also soon joined these discussions). Over the period of a 
year, ISDA was formed (known initially as the International Swaps Dealers Association 
before changing its name later to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association). 
In 1985, ISDA issued what it termed a Code which set out definitions that were shared by 
all participants.  ISDA documents from this point onwards have become crucial means 
whereby the nature of derivatives as products has been framed in Callon’s terms (Callon 
1998). As new sorts of derivatives have been established, ISDA has become the arena in 
which market participants have discussed any issues arising from this process of framing. 
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Following on from this, ISDA documents have been modified to establish this frame and 
then ISDA itself has been one of the means whereby knowledge of and expertise in the 
new products has been disseminated across the market. In the early days of ISDA what 
was known as ‘the battle of the forms’ (i.e. the competition between different firms to 
have their own way of doing things – their own forms - legitimated as acceptable). 
culminated in the beginnings of this general commitment to collective solutions.  
 
ISDA established its central position in a number of ways. An important aspect was that 
ISDA grew internationally. ISDA set up an office in London in the early 1990s and this 
became important for ensuring that as these markets developed outside New York, new 
collective associations were not developed but that rather ISDA was reinforced. At the 
same time ISDA offices also opened in Tokyo and Singapore, and later offices in 
Washington DC and Brussels to ensure a presence in key regulatory locations. 
Intenrational banks and their subsidiaries were therefore always close to ISDA in 
geographical terms for advice and communication. 
 
ISDA was able to expand its membership rapidly from 80 primary members at the end of 
the 1980s to over 200 in 2001 and 224 in 2007 so that all significant participants in the 
derivatives markets were associated with it. In order to do this it created different 
categories of membership allowing organizations with different levels of expertise and 
centrality to the markets to choose the sort of involvement with ISDA that was 
appropriate to its own business. The Primary member category consists of those financial 
institutions that engage in swaps and derivatives work; it is in effect a list of the largest 
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global financial institutions plus a handful of the very largest industrial companies which 
have highly developed financial sections, e.g. oil industry firms such as BP. It is from this 
category that the main leadership of ISDA comes. ISDA also has Associate Members 
(276 in 2007 up form 100 in 2001) and Subscriber members (289 in 2007 up from around 
100 in 2001). Associate Members are predominantly law firms engaged in derivatives 
business, together with the largest accounting companies and some specialist financial 
firms. This group is concerned to know ISDA rules and engage in advising clients and 
others on these rules and how they might change. Finally, Subscriber Members are 
primarily organizations that engage in buying derivatives. They consist of smaller scale 
financial institutions, hedge funds, government bodies responsible for debt and liabilities, 
together with the Treasury function of some large industrial companies (e.g. Toyota, 
Volvo, Renault). As the market has developed, ‘ISDA has drawn in anybody who has 
anything other than a minimal interest in the market and how it functions’ (ISDA 
Respondent, March 2007). 
 
Membership of ISDA brings with it the right to participate in the rule making and 
communication activities of the organization. From the mid 1980s, a professional staff 
was developed to run ISDA on a daily basis. Leaving aside the creation of the Master 
Agreement which is discussed later, there are two major forms of activity which are 
coordinated through the professional staff but draw in the membership more widely.  
 
The first of these is the committee work of ISDA. There are two types of committees in 
ISDA. The first type is based on regional interests and in 2007 there are 5 of these 
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concerned with Asia-Pacific, Canada, Central and Eastern Europe, Japan and Latin 
America. The second type concerns a vast range of issues that impact on derivatives – 
Accounting, Collateral (with 3 sub-groups), Credit Derivatives Market Practice, 
Derivative Users Committee, Documentation, Energy, Commodities and Developing 
Products Committee, Equity Derivatives, Operations (with 5 working groups), 
Regulatory (which lists 22 formal responses made by this ISDA committee to European 
regulatory issues and 11 responses to US regulatory issues), Risk Management, Tax (with 
5 working groups), and Trading Practice (4 main issues currently under review). Big 
committees have co-chairs from different locations (in the case of Regulation, one each 
from Europe, Japan and the US) and may be serviced by members of the permanent staff 
from both New York and London. Committees meet according to their own preferred 
schedule; virtual meetings particularly amongst the most important members are of 
growing importance. Membership of committees is open to those interested in the topic. 
In these ways, ISDA pulls together a network of global expertise on particular issues. 
These actors are highly informed about recent developments and problems which may be 
emerging in the market. On this basis, ISDA and its representatives are able to engage 
with governments and regulators on a highly authoritative basis, playing a major role in 
framing the market and in dealing with what Callon (1998) describes as ‘overflows’, i.e. 
controversial situations which do not exist the initial frame.  
 
ISDA also has a very important role as a communication channel to both its membership 
and to others beyond that who have an interest in derivatives. It is concerned to ensure 
that its framing of derivatives and any changes arising from new products or dealing with 
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overflows are understood and made clear to market participants. In order to do this it 
engages in many meetings each year to which members are invited. It has a big annual 
meeting each year (in 2006 in Singapore) It supplements this by a large number of 
meetings on specific topics in Europe, Australasia and the Americas. These meetings 
range in scope from introductions on the Fundamentals of Derivatives to Documentation 
seminars to workshops on the ISDA Master Agreement. ISDA is active in making sure 
that as new geographical areas (most obviously China) begin to develop derivatives 
markets or new sectors look for more involvement with derivatives, they learn how the 
system works through ISDA and they join ISDA. 
 
Thus ISDA is the private body through which the different, competitive actors in the 
market come together to create and maintain common standards. In this way, some 
predictability and certainty is brought into a potentially very complex set of relationships. 
What is equally important to note, however, is that this is continually evolving. ISDA’s 
committees are not ways of constraining its members but ways of opening up new areas 
of agreement that can push forward new types of products. In its efforts to legalise, to 
clear the regulatory decks and to resolve the operational problems, ISDA is very much a 
market making organization, encouraging innovation and the development of new 
products and services. These are characteristics that cannot be undertaken inside public, 
legislative frameworks which invariably are about constraint and control. In this sense, 
the new form of governance does facilitate market expansion and market transformation 
in ways that could not previously have happened. As well as the shift towards expert 
governance, this illustrates the centrality of the framing process and keeping this up to 
 17 
date in order to facilitate innovation and growth in the market. It also reveals the 
importance of maintaining strong network linkages amongst the participants in the 
market. What is less clear thus far is the political nature of this market building exercise. 
This is revealed more clearly in the following section examining the ISDA Master 
Agreement.  
 
ISDA’s Master Agreement 
The power of ISDA is particularly revealed in what is known as its Master Agreement. 
Following the ‘battle of the forms’ and the Code referred to earlier, there remained a 
strong feeling amongst some ISDA members that more was required. For a number of 
years therefore, intensive discussions occurred amongst ISDA members about how to 
develop more standard forms of documentation and definition. This culminated in the 
publication in 1992 of the Master Agreement, which set out in detail the ongoing legal 
and credit relationships between the parties and defined how each transaction the parties 
entered into would be governed. In 2002, an updated version was produced. The great 
bulk of OTC contracts are made using the ISDA Master Agreements (mainly still the 
1992 version). It is important to note that this agreement is private. It is not in itself 
inscribed in any national legal system. It is an agreement amongst ISDA members that 
facilitates their business by creating a common contractual form. The problem is, 
however, that the Master agreement was not simply free-floating, unconnected in any 
way with sanctions and hard law at the national and the international levels. There are 
two particular areas in derivatives contracts which have become of central importance in 
this respect. These areas are known as ‘netting agreements’ and ‘collateral agreements’ 
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and they reveal the interdependence of soft ‘transnational’ private agreements with hard 
national legal systems. They also reveal the political and distributional significance of the 
ISDA Master Agreement. 
 
Netting agreements  
Netting refers to the process whereby all the debts and credits between two actors in the 
market are aggregated (netted) to produce one single settlement figure – it is as if all 
debts and obligations cancel one another out until a single figure is left. If netting is 
allowed it has an impact on actions taken when one of the counterparties goes bankrupt. 
It means that the creditor is not left with a mass of unresolved transactions but rather one 
settlement figure. This is particularly important for financial institutions not just because 
it places them in a privileged position in any potential bankruptcy case but also because 
on a day-to-day basis it reduces the capital which it has to set aside to cover the 
requirements of the Basle capital adequacy rules.  Therefore, acceptance of netting 
provisions is highly beneficial to firms in the OTC derivatives market and the ISDA is 
keen to ensure that netting is legitimate in derivatives transactions. 
 
Prior to the agreement on netting, dealers operated what they termed a walk-away clause. 
If one party went bankrupt, the other party simply walked away from the transaction. 
Central bankers saw this as untidy and unhelpful for systemic order. They wished for a 
full netting out of all transactions to see where the holes lay. Central bankers reinforced 
this by their capital adequacy rules which were designed to restrict the ability of banks to 
take on risks by forcing them to lay aside capital in order to meet downside 
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contingencies. Banks argued that it was important to take account of what they were 
owed not just what they had risked. This could be done by netting out derivatives 
contracts and producing one figure of the sums at risk. This would be the figure that 
would be used to assess the capital adequacy of the bank. Netting therefore became an 
increasingly important requirement for those engaged in derivatives trades. Was netting 
legal?  
 
Although most US and UK banks were confident that netting fitted the tradition of their 
own legal system, the answers to these questions were not entirely certain particularly 
where one of the contracting parties was based in a non US or UK jurisdiction. Although 
the number of examples of bankruptcy that involve derivatives trading have been 
relatively small (most obviously Barings, Long-Term Capital Management and Enron), 
nevertheless, it has been seen of importance to the market to solve this.  Riles, for 
example, states that ‘in Japan as in the United Kingdom and many other countries, the 
Bankruptcy Code, written long before the advent of derivatives, is silent on the question 
of netting’ (Riles 2000: 19-20). In this case, however, silence is not ‘golden’;  
“The reason for the uncertainty as to the enforceability of close-out netting provisions, it 
should be noted, is that the effect of a Netting Law (or of a judicial interpretation of 
existing bankruptcy law to the same effect) is to subordinate general creditors’ rights in 
cases of bankruptcy  to the rights of counterparties to swap agreements’ (ibid 23). 
The problem for the firm where there is no netting is that if its counterparty goes 
bankrupt, the initiating firm is going to have to wait in line with all the other creditors 
according to the laws and regulations of the particular context in which the counterparty 
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was registered. To agree to netting for derivatives contracts is therefore in effect a form 
of privileging for actors in the OTC derivatives financial markets by quickly and simply 
resolving their total exposure. In this sense, netting, although seemingly a technical and 
abstruse matter for market participants, is actually a political issue since it goes against 
the underlying principles of most bankruptcy laws. Werlen and Flanagan, lawyers from 
Allen and Overy, the ISDA’s advisers, state that ‘there is an inherent tension between 
netting and the provisions of many jurisdictions’ insolvency regimes…as a result it is 
important for parties to master agreements ..to be certain that their netting agreement will 
be enforceable in jurisdictions in which an insolvency of a party might occur’ (Werlen 
and Flanagan 2002: 157).  
 
Over the years, the ISDA has sought to resolve this in a number of ways. Firstly it has 
drawn up with its lawyers what is described on its website as a Model Netting Law. This 
model is offered to national legislators as a means of ensuring that Netting is legitimated 
in the formal legal code of a country. Secondly it has lobbied governments strongly to 
incorporate this legal provision.  
“Ensuring the enforceability of the netting provisions of the ISDA Master Agreement has 
been, and remains, a key initiative, because of its importance in reducing the credit risk 
arising from the business. The Association's work in this area has resulted in a series of 
laws being passed in various countries that ensure legal certainty in those nations.” 
(http://www.isda.org/ - accessed 25 May, 2006) 
This is a complex task. This is not because the ISDA lacks power; as one might expect its 
host of contacts with major law firms, investment bankers and regulators make it a 
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central node in the law-making process (e.g. as described in Quack 2007).  Huault and 
Rainelli describe one of their respondents, a banker in a large multinational financial 
institutions as saying that “At a global level the ISDA has colossal power, they pay 
lawyers worldwide, all the profession joins and they lobby the regulators’ (Huault and 
Rainelli 2006: 14). The problem arises from a combination of the endogeneity of law-
making, (i.e. the need to frame new legislation in terms consonant with existing 
expectations of law) and the inevitable potential politicisation of law.  
 
The nature of bankruptcy law in different countries is complex and can become 
politically charged as a conflict between different sorts of creditors, between debtors and 
creditors, between national and international rules (see e.g. Carruthers and Halliday 1998; 
Halliday and Carruthers 2007; Riles 2000; 2005). Whilst Netting legislation passed fairly 
simply into US law, this was not the case with Japan where as Riles shows, it became an 
object of contestation between different ministries and different legal traditions (Riles 
2000). ISDA prefers to do this through legislation and has been very effective in 
achieving it in many of countries – around 50 jurisdictions. Only rarely does legislation 
get delayed as is the case currently with discussions on netting in Russia. Netting is 
obviously quite a complex problem to understand. In general, changes to Netting are 
treated as being a technical issue of concern only to the market participants themselves 
and the regulators. Such changes may be slipped through the legislature in clauses or 
appendices to a Finance Bill and rarely generate any heat amongst political 
representatives. Their impact on distributional outcomes in bankruptcy proceedings or on 
the ability of banks to meet their obligations in times of financial collapse is generally not 
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highlighted. The issue has relatively low political saliency and although it has definite 
distributional consequences, it rarely becomes an object of public debate. This is very 
much in line with how expert power can be utilised to change things on the basis of 
technical rationality without any recourse to the political implications of doing so.   
 
Even so, the power of ISDA should not be overestimated. Even where the law has 
changed, given its impact across other areas, there may be uncertainty about how any 
actual cases might work out in practice. For this reason and because many jurisdictions 
make no explicit mention of netting in their law (which given the recent growth of the 
market is not surprising), ISDA also has to prompt the law into action.  
“Banks must not only have a netting agreement in place, but must also obtain a legal 
opinion stating that netting agreements will be upheld in all relevant jurisdictions.”  
(Werlen and Flanagan 2002: 157) 
ISDA has therefore been active in commissioning legal opinions from high status firms 
and lawyers in different countries about whether netting is legal. In some jurisdictions, a 
positive statement that netting will work is required; in others this is less necessary. 
However, such opinions are a further important source of confidence in the market and a 
source of evidence in relation to dealing with banking regulators. Thus netting opinions 
can used by banks to justify certain calculations regarding the amount of capital that 
needs to be allocated to cover the risk on transactions. 
 
Netting illustrates that ISDA cannot sustain a contract purely on the basis of private soft 
law. In order for the system to operate in the way which the ISDA and its members want, 
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national public law needs to be taken into account. Even though ISDA has high levels of 
resources to promote its case and support its arguments, it has to work through the 
existing national systems. These systems can be changed overtly but this may lead to 
political problems. However, the system can also be re-interpreted and read in new ways 
by legal experts so as to make netting appear lawful (see for example, Riles’ discussion 
of Japan where she describes ISDA’s attempts to achieve a definitive legal statement in 
the light of competition and disagreement between the two leading Japanese legal 
commentators on financial markets: Riles 2000). Private legal opinions avoid entirely the 
public realm where political problems may emerge even though this is very rare with 
such a complex and seemingly technical issue is concerned but ultimately specific legal 
authority in legislation is the preferred option for ISDA.  
 
Collateral 
The second major issue of concern is that of collateral. Netting rules are only part of the 
answer to the issue of the bankruptcy of a counterparty. Another mechanism is the 
deposit of collateral by one of the parties. Derivatives markets, by definition, work on 
principles of leverage and margins. What is being purchased is a right or an option to buy 
in the future. Thus a financial actor can purchase a right to buy for a fraction of the cost 
of the final transaction – what is called ‘on the margin’. This clearly creates a further risk.  
Will the purchaser have sufficient funds to close out the contract? This can be particularly 
difficult in times of wide financial crisis as prices fall across a range of products rather 
than just one, pushing firms into difficult situations. Increasingly derivatives markets 
have moved towards a system of collateral in order to reduce the risk of such a collapse. 
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Collateral is also, like netting, a way of ensuring that capital adequacy rules do not 
constrain the bank’s activity. Collateral weighs against capital adequacy requirements 
increasing the funds available for contracting. ISDA states that ‘Collateralization works 
to provide an asset of value that is to the side of the primary transaction; in the event of 
default on the primary transaction, the collateral receiver has recourse to the collateral 
asset and can thus indirectly make good any loss suffered’ (ISDA 2005: 7).  
 
In organized exchanges, the principle of collateral is already well established. Exchanges 
operate a Clearing system so that in effect, all contracts are between the Clearing system 
and a member of the exchange. Thus if two parties make a transaction, they in effect 
place  the Exchange Clearing house in the middle, depositing their margin and collateral 
there. Contracts are closed out through the Clearing system rather than bilaterally. This 
system is enforceable as a condition of membership thus providing security to members 
in terms of collateral and its management. On top of this, exchanges have operated for 
some time a system of ‘mark to market’ with regard to collateral. The value of the 
collateral posted may change as markets move so what was once worth 25% of the total 
contract may now be worth 20% or 30%. What ‘mark to market’ means is that the 
collateral is revalued (usually on a daily basis) and additions or subtractions to the 
account in the Clearing system are made on the basis of these recalculations. Thus the 
risk element remains the same rather than widening or narrowing as the market moves. 
The Exchange may make a ‘margin call’ requiring one of the participants to put more 
into the account to cover market changes. ‘Mark to market’ is not just a complex 
financial and organizational feature of derivatives trading. Again, it can also make a 
 25 
difference to the capital adequacy requirements of a bank and to its profitability. 
Nevertheless it is an important reassurance to market participants that counterparties can 
meet their obligations. 
 
How can this work in the OTC market? There is clearly no single authority that can act to 
provide ‘neutral’ oversight of the market and/or margin deposits. Nor can there be a 
single clearing system in this global world of transactions in the way there can in 
physically bounded exchanges. So what mechanisms have emerged and how are they 
governed? 
 
The first point is that collateral arrangements (marked to market) have indeed become 
established in the OTC derivatives markets. In a survey conducted by the ISDA in 2006, 
‘respondents reported that approximately 59% of their derivative transactions are secured 
by collateral agreements and 63% of mark-to-market credit exposure is covered by 
collateral. These results continue a trend of increasing coverage during the past several 
years. The 2003 Survey, for example, reported coverage of 30% of trades and 29% of 
exposure…Large firms are the most active users of collateral’ (ISDA 2006:2). The 
largest form of collateral is cash, particularly US$ and Euros (about 75%); government 
securities are the next most important form of collateral. Collateral is most frequently 
deposited with the counterparty to the trade though occasionally it will be held by a 
neutral third party custodian (though this is affected by the law under which the contract 
is written – a point to be discussed later). As with the organized exchanges, collateral for 
OTC derivatives is ‘marked to market’, altering on a daily basis. ISDA states that ‘some 
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firms are now managing collateral asset pools approaching US£100 billion in size 
[and]…the total amount of collateral assets reported in 2004….exceeded US£1 trillion for 
the first time ever’ (ISDA 2005: 69). 
 
The use of collateral is, of course, potentially risky. What rules govern the usage of the 
collateral by the receiving party? As with netting, the ISDA has been concerned to have 
national legal recognition of the collateral rules. Werlen and Flanagen state that ‘there is 
a risk that a court may not allow an agreement for the outright transfer of collateral to 
take effect in accordance with its terms and this again raises uncertainties which the 
ISDA wishes to avoid’ (Werlen and Flanagan 2002: 157). Again, therefore, its model 
Netting Act provides a legal framework for collateral and it has also commissioned legal 
opinions to confirm its case. The private, soft law model of the ISDA Master Agreement 
requires national law of some sort to solve one of its key problems. It needs to be assured 
that the delivery of collateral between parties will be recognised as legal in local 
jurisdictions.  
 
The first step in this process is for the parties to apply a ‘choice of law’ clause to the 
contract; in other words, the participants to a contract state in that contract which law will 
apply to the handling of the collateral. Whilst ‘choice of law’ recognizes that territoriality 
is no longer the determinant of the applicable law, it nevertheless returns to national 
jurisdiction ultimately where endogenous developments shape the limits of how collateral 
can be organized in OTC derivatives markets. There are two basic models of collateral. 
They are called the ‘security interest’ approach and the ‘title transfer approach’. Under a 
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security interest model, ‘the collateral provider generally continues to own the securities 
and/or cash, subject to the right of the receiver to sell the securities and/or take the cash if 
the collateral receiver defaults’ whilst ‘under title transfer, the collateral receiver owns 
the collateral, without restriction, and the collateral provider, if it performs in full, is only 
entitled to the return of fungible securities and/or repayment of cash in the same security’ 
(ISDA 2005: 38). Title transfer in effect gives the receiver free rein of what to do with the 
collateral over the period of its existence whilst the security interest model is much more 
restrictive. The ISDA identifies 4 basic types of national law which can be applied to 
collateral dealings. These are; 
• The New York Annex: which adopts a security interest approach 
• The English deed, also reflecting the security interest approach 
• The English Annex – a title transfer approach 
• The Japanese Annex; Japanese law recognises both approaches and under the 
Japanese Annex, participants choose which approach . 
In choosing one of these annexes, participants to a contract define the legal basis of the 
collateral and provide themselves with a form of redress should anything go wrong. This 
can only be achieved by appealing to national systems of law and enforcement. 
 
ISDA has sought legal opinions to see whether these arrangements are locally 
enforceable; in other words, could a counterparty based in one country renege on its 
choice of law clause if it was in its economic interests to do so? ISDA’s findings were 
that legal jurisdictions (in the 34 states it surveyed) either allowed the security interest 
model or the title transfer approach. In other words, there could be no escape from the 
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commitment in the original contract. It did however note that there were a few countries 
(Norway, South Africa and Taiwan) where there was a small risk that a title transfer 
collateral could have been changed by the courts to a security interest approach if there 
was a legal challenge. As with Netting, legal opinions leave room for doubt but in 
general, the ISDA felt the Annexes were enforceable.  
 
ISDA requires a firm foundation for collateral if the risks from trading are to be 
somewhat mitigated. On its own as a private rule making body it cannot achieve this. It 
has therefore sought legal backing for collateralization and has found that in certain 
national traditions of lawmaking and dispute resolution. Drawing out the implications of 
these national traditions it has evolved legal justifications for particular models of 
collateralization. It has gone further to test legal opinion across the most significant 
jurisdictions for derivatives seeking to assess whether these justifications are protection 
against the idiosyncrasies of local law. By publishing legal opinions from prestigious 
lawyers that support its argument, it has succeeded in building a de facto, if not yet de 
jure, system in which collateral exchange can be effectively achieved. Again it has used 
its access to lawyers and legislators as well as the expertise of its members to achieve 
this. The result is not government by bureaucratic rationality but a form of dispersed 
governance in which private law and public law are linked together. 
 
The Global Financial system and derivatives 
Beyond national impediments to ISDA, there are also international issues concerned 
mainly with the financial market uncertainty that can be created by deriviativesFor these 
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reasons, derivatives trading is overseen by The Committee on the Global Financial 
System which is a central bank forum within the Bank for International Settlements. This 
committee has a role in the monitoring and examination of broad issues relating to 
financial markets and systems with a view to elaborating appropriate policy 
recommendations to support the central banks in the fulfilment of their responsibilities 
for monetary and financial stability. Trading in derivatives is a central part of this 
oversight. In a speech to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in 2005, Alan Greenspan, 
still at that Chair of the US Federal Reserve system, noted a number of potential threats 
to the wider financial system that came out of the growth of derivatives, especially in the 
OTC market. One risk related to the concentration occurring in certain derivatives market 
that could lead to wider failure if one player in the market was severely damaged. The 
example of Long Term Capital Management which collapsed in 1998 leaving large 
numbers of derivatives contracts hanging and thereby threatening the stability of the 
global system remains of concern to central bankers (see Dunbar 2001; Lowenstein 2001; 
MacKenzie 2003).The two other risks related to ‘the use of credit derivatives to transfer 
risk outside the banking system and about the growing role of hedge funds in bearing risk 
in derivative markets’ (Greenspan 2005). These concerns reflect a recognition amongst 
central bankers that derivative markets and the actors in them need to be monitored.  
 
Similarly, regulators have begun to get together to gain oversight of derivatives meetings. 
The main regulators in the US and the UK (SEC, CFTC and SIB-now the FSA) got 
together in 2003 to ‘identify ways in which they can cooperate in their respective 
regulatory approaches to OTC derivatives business’. They committed themselves to 
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promote appropriate netting devices in the context of regulatory capital standards that 
‘encourage incentives for good risk management’ (http:www,cftc.gov/oiaotcderovs 
– accessed 23 May 2006). The 2007 Report from BIS on Clearing and Settlement 
Arrangements raised a number of other problems with how the system was operating. 
One problem has been the large backlogs of unsigned master agreements, i.e. where 
verbal deals have been made but the paperwork had not followed until some weeks later, 
and the consequent risks that arose from this delay (BIS 2007). Other problems that have 
arisen derive from the increasing presence of hedge funds as speculators in the 
derivatives markets. Hedge funds increasingly use particular financial institutions in a 
prime brokerage capacity across a variety of their activities including now between the 
hedge fund itself and executing dealers. The legal position and the financial 
consequences of this for the prime brokers is not clear and may result in risk positions 
being taken without adequate backing. Secondly, hedge funds have effectively begun to 
establish a market in selling on derivatives. This is what is known as novation where a 
contract between two original counterparties is replaced because one party (usually a 
hedge fund) steps out of the deal and this side of the contract is transferred to a third 
party. The BIS report focuses on the continued need to develop common standards and 
systems of clearing. A central element in this concerns the development of electronic 
trading systems as discussed earlier. Such systems impose an audit trail and have the 
advantage of transparency in terms of prices but progress towards this is halting. Some 
financial institutions have set them up for their own clients rather than opening them out 
to the market in general and as yet there is no agreement on this. 
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Conclusions 
What has been described reveals the way in which this particular market has emerged. 
The study shows that issues of power, networks and framing have been important in these 
developments. From the perspective of power and politics in the formation of a market, 
ISDA is a powerful association which represents the largest financial institutions and 
their clients engaged in the derivatives market. These actors are concerned to develop a 
context where the market for derivatives is orderly and legal, but open to innovation and 
change. As well as the lobbying power which it can exercise alongside its individual 
members, ISDA uses its own expert power and that of the law firms which it employs in 
different parts of the world in order to achieve this. It pressurises governments to 
establish a legislative basis for derivatives trading along the lines of the ISDA Master 
Agreement and the Model Netting Act. Further it is concerned that this should be put in 
place even if it is at the expense of other actors in the system, as most obviously in terms 
of bankruptcy rules and regulations and the use of netting procedures. Other concerns 
about derivatives such as their proximity to gambling, their contribution to speculation 
and financial instability, their centrality to increasing levels of inequality and reward 
between top earners in the financial sector and the rest of the population, are swept aside 
as irrelevant to the basic technical problem of how to ensure that the market works 
properly for its participants. The agenda is set and potentially discomforting debates 
placed at the margins of public discourse.  
 
From the framing perspective developed by Callon (1998) ISDA frames derivatives 
contracts in ways which ensure that there is something which can be bought and sold 
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over the counter. ISDA also deals with overflow issues, ensuring that new products or 
uncertainties are identified, classified and framed. It engages in these processes on a 
continuous basis in an attempt to avoid potentially damaging externalities. 
 
Finally, drawing on White and others, ISDA works to create the market through its 
activity as a network, pulling the latest information in from its members, the market 
participants, collating and framing the information and then communicating it to its 
members via committees, publications, seminars and conferences across the globe.  
 
In this respect, the market formation process and the development of governance 
mechanisms is the outcome of power and politics, networks and processes of framing. 
The study also reveals that financial markets increasingly rely on experts,  soft law and 
voluntary self-regulation to develop.  However, it is also important to remember that this 
process rests in a number of important respects on traditional models of law and 
government as well as on emerging international bodies such as those bringing together 
central bankers. Governance in this market is multi-levelled. It is both public and private, 
national and international. These different levels have become intertwined. This comes 
about through the way in which ISDA and its agents seek to enrol the traditional forces of 
law and government in areas where voluntary self-regulation is weak or has effects that 
are potentially detrimental to the development of the market. Thus netting and collateral 
are central but they can only work in the way which ISDA requires if national law does 
not contradict them and if international bodies of central bankers continue to support this 
system. Therefore governance in this market cannot be understood as a totally private 
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process; it requires the enrolment of national legal systems and international bodies as 
supports. These supports always retain an element of conditionality as broad financial 
collapse invariably evokes some sort of political reaction at the national and the 
international level. Developments in the financial markets in the summer of 2007 
associated with the collapse of US sub-prime mortgages have been connected with the 
derivatives markets and through them to the collapse and potential collapse of a number 
of banks. This has turned the public spotlight onto these processes and stirred up a wide 
sense of outrage at these markets but so long as central bankers seem able to stabilize the 
system and national politicians are unwilling to act, it appears unlikely that this will be 
sufficient to counteract the existing forces in the market.  
 
In conclusion, this paper argues that there are new forms of governance emerging in 
order to build these markets. These forms of governance are multi-faceted and multi-
levelled, bringing public and private, national and international together. Private actors as 
well as building their own systems of rules engage in this role of reshaping national 
jurisdictions. Here, however the heavy hand of history weighs on them. Legal traditions 
limit to varying degrees what can be achieved in formal systems of law but possibilities 
arise of getting round this through harnessing legal opinions and implementing ‘choice of 
law’ clauses that choose ‘friendly’ jurisdictions. Government is not dropped from the 
equation; it is in a precarious balance with forces of private governance.  This 
precariousness is reflected in conflicts between different actors, different legal arenas and 
different interests. Governance and government go together and the interesting question 
is how the balance between the two is played out in different arenas. Further research can 
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consider whether this particular model of market formation and governance is common 
across the financial sector or indeed in other sectors. One expectation would be that the 
more ‘political’ and public market formation issues are, the more likely the state is to 
play a direct role (as is the case for retail financial services such as pensions and 
mortgages in most countries). Similarly the more diversity of interest there is amongst 
market participants, the more difficult it may be to form a single associational voice as 
was achieved with ISDA (where the large financial institutions and lawyers shared an 
interest in making the market work even if they were going to be competitors afterwards). 
The more diverse the voices of market participants, the more likely they will seek to enrol 
support beyond their immediate circle, thus potentially creating a broader public arena for 
debate about governance. Overall it is to be expected that there will be a variety of forms 
of governance, though it can be expected that emergent systems will be multi-levelled 
and populated by a variety of public and private actors.  
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